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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * 
UTAH HOTEL COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
-vs-
R. MILTON YORGASON, in his 
official capacity as Salt 
Lake County Assessor; and 
WILLIAM E. DUNN, ROBERT G. 
SALTER, WILLIAM L. HUTCHINSON, 
each in their official 
capacities as members of the 
Board of Equalization for 
Salt Lake County, 
Defendants & 
Respondents 
* * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Case No,. 17612 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the lower 
court dismissing Appellant's Amended Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ with prejudice. Appellant, Hotel Utah 
Company, filed an Amended Petition for Extraordinary Writ in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking to preclude 
the Salt Lake County Assessor from appropriately valuing 
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Appellant's property for the year 1980 and requiring Salt 
Lake County to accept the 1978 value for Appellant's pro-
perty as established by the State Tax Commission of Utah ~ 
an informal hearing. The initial action filed by the 
Appellant was filed with the Court even prior to the date 
that Appellant made an administrative appeal from the dee~ 
sion of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
Appellant, in the manner in which it has attempted to 
posture the case presently before the Court, is seeking to 
avoid any inquiry into the current value of its property 
and, in effect, asserts that the value for the year 1978 is 
the value for all subsequent years. Respondent, County 
Assessor and County Board of Equalization assert that theR 
is an affirmative statutory duty to value all properties 
within the County at its value as of January 1, 12:00 noon 
of each year and that the statute that Appellant, Hotel Utah 
Company relies upon to preclude the fulfillment of this sta-
tutory duty relates only to county-wide reappraisal under 
the direction of the State Tax Commission of Utah and accor-
dingly moved to dismiss Appellant's Amended Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ, which Motion was granted by the trial 
court. 
2 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Respondents Motion to 
Dismiss Appellant's Amended Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
thereby confirming the affirmative duty placed upon the 
Assessor to value all taxable property within the County as 
of January 1, 12:00 noon of each year. The lower court also 
dismissed Appellant's Amended Petition for Extraordinary 
Writ on the grounds that the Appellant had failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a decision of this Court affirming 
the decision of the trial court and thereby upholding the sta-
tutory duty of the assessor of each county to value and 
assess all taxable property within the county as of January 
1, 12:00 noon. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Hotel Utah Company, is a Utah cor-
poration and is the owner of real property located within 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more particularly described 
in Salt Lake County Assessor's records under serial numbers 
3 
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01-3023, 01-3024-001 and, 01-3024-002. (T-136.) 
Appellant's property was valued by Salt Lake Count: 
for tax purposes, for the year 1978, during the year 1978, 
Appellant appealed the 1978 valuation to the s~~ 
Tax Commission. The value of Appellant's property for tax 
year 1978 was adjusted by a decision of the State Tax 
Commission of Utah. (T-136.) 
The decisions of the Tax Commission specifically 
limited their applicability to tax year 1978. (T-24-25,) 
During tax year 1980, the Salt Lake County Assessor 
determined Appellant's valuation for tax year 1980. That 
valuation was appealed to the County Board of Equalizatioo. 
That Board, after consideration of Appellant's appeal, 
upheld the 1980 valuation by the Salt Lake County Assessor. 
The Appellant then appealed the decision of the Salt La~ 
Board of Equalization to the State Tax Commission of Utah. 
Appellant's appeal of the 1980 valuation is still pending 
before the State Tax Commission of Utah. (T-136.) 
Appellant filed its Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
with the Court nearly two months prior to appealing to the 
State Tax Commission. (T-2-32 and T-98-103.) 
In their petition to the Court, Appellants sought 
to require Salt Lake County to use the same value in 1980 
4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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that was used two years earlier in 1978. 
T-62-94.) 
(T-2-32 and 
No where in Appellant's petition is there any evi-
dence of 1980 valuation. The only evidence as to 1980 
valuation are the assessor's assessments and the decisions 
of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
T-91-94.) 
(T-27-30 and 
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting 
that the Court was without jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the action because Appellant had failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies; that Appellant was required, as 
a condition precedent to bringing the action, to pay the 
taxes under protest and file a claim for refund; and that 
the remedies sought by Appellant were specifically prohi-
bited by Section 59-11-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. Respondent, County, in its Memorandum in Support 
of its Motion to Dismiss also contended that Appellant's 
reliance upon Section 59-5-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended was misplaced because the statute did not apply 
to this particular case. Respondents asserted that while 
said statutory provision was passed by the Legislature for 
purposes of equalizing values between and among the various 
counties of the State of Utah, it did not conflict with or 
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limit the ongoing statutory duty and obligation of the 
Assessor set forth in Section 59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, to assess property located within the 
county to its owner at its value as of 12: 00 noon the first 
day of January of the year in which the assessment was made, 
(T-137,) 
The trial court concluded that Section 59-5-109(2), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, was passed by the 
legislature specifically for the purpose of equalizing 
values between and among the various counties of the State oi 
Utah and therefore did not preclude the assessor of each 
county from valuing properties within the county on an 
annual basis as of January 1 of each year and assessing 
current property taxes against those properties. The Court 
further concluded that Section 59-5-109(2), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, did not require Salt Lake 
County to use the Tax Commission decision as to value for 
the year 1978 as the value of Appellant's property two years 
later for tax year 1980. (T-137,) 
The Court thereupon dismissed Appellant's petition 
with prejudice in so far as it sought to limit the 
Assessor's legal capacity to value property on an annual 
basis. (T-137.) 
6 
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POINT I 
ARGUMENT 
THE COUNTY ASSESSOR IS REQUIRED BY LAW TO VALUE ALL 
TAXABLE PROPERTY WITHIN THE COUNTY AT ITS VALUE AS 
OF THE FIRST DAY OF JANUARY OF EACH YEAR. 
Section 59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, was first enacted in 1898. That statute has been 
in effect for more than 82 years. While there have been 
some modifications of the 1898 statute, the language rela-
tive to the assessor's duty concerning annual valuation has 
remained unchanged since the original enactment. 
In said statute, the assessor's annual statutory 
duty is to: 
" •.. ascertain the names of all taxable inhabitants 
and all property in the county subject to taxation 
except such as is required to be assessed by the 
State Tax Commission and must assess such property 
to the person by whom it was owned or claimed, or 
in whose possession or control it was, at 12 
o'clock m. of the 1st day of January next pre-
ceeding, and at its value on that date; •••• " 
(Emphasis supplied.) Section 59-5-4, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The same statute further charges assessors with 
the duty to: 
" ••• become fully acquainted with all property in 
their respective counties, and are required to 
visit each separate district or precinct either in 
person or by deputy, annually, and in person or by 
deputy annually to inspect the ~roperty.they are 
required to assess ... " (Emphasis supplied.) 
7 
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The above and foregoing language was in the statute 
71 years prior to the time that the section relied upon by t 
Appellant, was enacted. Similarly, the above statute was 
reaffirmed by the 1981 legislature. See Sections 59-5-4 anc 
59-5-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Respondent has found no Utah case interpreting the 
underlined portion of the annual valuation statute cited 
above. Perhaps the language of the statute relative to 
annual valuation is so clear in its expressed terms, that no 
need for interpretation exists. The Supreme Court of 
Arizona, confronting similar statutory language had this ~ 
say: 
" ••• since the full cash value of all property shall 
be determined yearly, the statute contemplates that 
valuations may change from time to time and that 
county assessors are directed to make these chan~s 
yearly as circumstances demand. Security 
Properties v. Arizona Department of Property 
Valuation, 537 P. 2d 924 (Ariz. 1975) at page 926. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The Court in reaching its decision in the above 
case referred to the case of Transamerica Development Co. v. 
County of Maricopa, 489 P. 2d 33 (Ariz. 1971) wherein a sta· 
tement was made that should dispose of this case: 
"While there may be some evidentiary value in pre· 
vious valuation for purposes of arriving at full 
cash value, the assessment must be considered on a 
year-to-year basis, and the previous year's 
valuation is not controlling." 489 P.2d at 36. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
8 
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Appellant, in the instant case wants this Court to 
foreclose any possible inquiry into Appellant's current 
value. It wants previous year's values to be controlling. 
It wants this Court to say: 1978 equals 1980--end of 
inquiry. Why is this so? Appellant wants to force Salt 
Lake County to accept in perpetuity a 1978 decision of the 
Tax Commission after an informal conference. Respondents 
don't even know why the Tax Commission reduced the 
Appellant's value for that year. A review of the Tax 
Commission's decisions affecting Appellant's property makes 
reference to " ••. taxation purposes for the year 1978." 
(T-24-25). The decisions of the Tax Commission do not say 
for all subsequent years. The decisions of the Tax 
Commission do not say for the year 1980. They are specifi-
cally limited to 1978. Further reference to those decisions 
will show that one decision was reached " ••• in lieu of an 
informal hearing •.• " (T-24) No explanation for the adjust-
ment is given. No findings are made. No specific evidence 
is cited. In fact, Salt Lake County, after learning of the 
extent of the adjustment made to Appellant's property, 
endeavored to learn the basis for the decision. One indica-
tion is that the income approach to valuation was used and 
9 
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since the Hotel Utah had finished a multi-million dollar 
expansion project during the year 1978, it was not up to 
full occupancy. A discounted rate of occupancy was purpo~ 
tedly given. However, by 1980 the Hotel was considered ~ 
be at full or near full capacity, contrary to the situation 
in 1978, thereby necessitating a removal of the discount anc 
corresponding increase in value. (T-124). 
The situation confronting Salt Lake County in 1978 
was similar to what was confronting Maricopa County Arizona 
in Security Properties v. Arizona Department of Property 
Valuation, Supra. The Assessor in that case testified that 
they n ••• were attempting to correct errors,n meaning the 
errors which had occurred in the statewide revaluation 
program ••• " 537 P. 2d at page 926. Salt Lake County was 
revalued in 1978. Over 200, 000 separate parcels of property 
existed at that time. There were over 8, 000 appeals during 
the year. Obviously the County could not ascertain the 
accuracy of all assessments during that year. In 1980 when 
the assessor learned of the apparent discrepancy in the 
current value of the Hotel Utah property, he undertook W 
correct it. Not only is this good assessment practice, but 
it is action that was contemplated by the legislature of 
this state when it enacted Section 59-11-3, Utah Code 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Annotated, 1953, as amended, which provides: 
"Omissions, errors or defects in form in the 
Assessment book, when it can be ascertained 
therefrom what was intended, may, with the consent 
of the county commissioners, be supplied or 
corrected by the Assessor at anytime prior to sale 
for delinquent taxes and after the original 
assessment was made." 
In addition, the assessor must certify under oath 
that he has allowed no one to escape a " ••• just and equal 
assessment ••• " See 59-5-30 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. If he permits underassessment to occur, he and his 
sureties are subject to suit by the county attorney. 
Section 59-5-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
And, the value of property underassessed being shown 
requires a judgment to be entered for the amount of 
uncollected taxes. See Section 59-5-36, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
A reasonable review of the above statutes clearly 
demonstrateds an intention on the part of the legislature to 
impose an affirmative duty upon each assessor to vigilantly 
maintain correct values on the assessment rolls. He has no 
choice. See also, Baker v. Tax Commission, 520 P. 2d 203 
(Utah, 1974), Tax year 1980 is not tax year 1978. Facts 
change. Conditions change. Circumstances change. As was 
stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon: 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
" ••• The interval between the transaction in the 
subject property sought to be introduced and the 
assessment date may be so great that it can be saic 
as a matter of law that there was a change in con-
ditions. However, where this determination cann~ 
be made as a matter of law, reference must be made 
to the underlying conditions affecting value befor, 
such evidence can be rejected." Sabin v. · 
Department of Revenue, 528 P. 2d 69 (Oregon, 1974) 
at page 71. In that case, the Plaintiff's value 
In that case, the Plaintiff's value had risen dra· 
matically. The area in which it was located had changed 
from low density suburban commercial area to the site of two 
shopping centers. Plaintiff contested the current value 
asserting that the 1969 purchase price he paid for the sub· 
ject property was controlling for the year 1971. The Court 
rejected his argument, reasoning: 
" ••• The evidence was conclusive that prices in the 
area of the subject property rose dramatically bet· 
ween 1969 and the assessment date because of a fun· 
damental change in the use of the land in the area. 
This rapid change in the basic condition affecting 
value rendered the 1969 purchase sufficiently 
remote to warrant its rejection." 
The Hotel Utah property, in part, is across the 
street from the Crossroads Shopping Mall. The Mall was not 
there in 1978. It was there in 1980. Did it have any 
affect on values? Certainly it should be a factor in 
Appellant's 1980 valuation. In Sabin, supra., the Court 
rejected a purchase of the subject property as fixing ilie 
value because it occurred two years prior to the current 
12 
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assessment date. This Court should also reject Appellant's 
1978 value as being the 1980 value. Particularly is this 
required when, as in this case, there is absolutely no 
evidence to controvert the assessor's 1980 valuation as 
affirmed by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
There is no factual basis upon which this Court could 
justify judicial intervention into the area of taxation. A 
mere difference of opinion as to the method to be used in 
computing valuation does not justify intervention. Pima 
County v. Cypress-Pima Mining Co., 579 P. 2d 1081 (Ariz. 
1978). See also Caldwell v. Department of Revenue, 596 P. 
2d 45 (Ariz. 1979) where the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld 
an assessment based upon the statutory presumption that an 
assessment is correct and lawful in the absence of suf-
ficient evidence to establish a different value. 
Some cases go so far as to say that a person 
challenging an assessment procedure must show systematic and 
intentional conduct deliberately creating inequality before 
judicial intervention will be allowed. See Xerox Corp. v. 
ADA County Assessor, 609 P. 2d 1129 (Idaho, 1980). 
Section 59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
and the other statutes cited above clearly establish the 
obligation on the part of the assessor to value property as 
13 
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of January 1 of each year. This will insure that all pro-
perties are valued on an annual basis and thereby carry oot 
the constitutional mandate of uniformity. The applicable 
statutes support this principle. The case law cited abow 
also support this position. The trial court's ruling 
currently insures that these principles will be followed. 
Appellant's should not be allowed to preclude inquiry in~ 
the value of its property for the year 1980 or any other 
year that inquiry is justified. The decision of the Trial 
Court was correct and should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
SECTION 59-5-109, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS 
AMENDED, 1979, APPLIES TO THE STATE-WIDE 
RE-APPRAISAL PROGRAM AND NOT AS A RESTRICTION OR 
LIMITATION UPON THE ASSESSOR'S ANNUAL DUTY TO 
APPRAISE PROPERTY AS OF JANUARY 1, 12:00 NOON. 
Appellant, Hotel Utah's entire case is based upon 
two misconceptions. 
The first misconception is that the law governi~ 
the manner in which the Tax Commission administers the re-
appraisal program for the entire State of Utah affects the 
miriad of statutes dealing with the assessment of properey 
within each county. 
The second misconception that the appellant has is 
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that the word "valuation" as used in the various assessment 
statutes means the same as the word "level". 
Reviewing the title of Section 59-5-109, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, 1979, reveals that the statute 
addresses the following subject: Revaluation of 
property--Tax commission to administer--Procedure--State-
county agreements--Record systems--Programs to be 
successive--Apportionment of expense--Reimbursement by 
counties--Disposition. 
As can be seen by the various subjects set forth in 
the heading of the statute, that statute covers the admi-
nistration of the state-wide, county by county, cyclical re-
appraisal program set up by the State Legislature in 1969. 
See Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 452 P. 2d 876 (Utah, 
1969) relating to the same duty under earlier statutes. 
The statute is located in the section of the Tax 
Code under the heading "Administration of Property Tax 
Assessments." Subsection 2 of that statute, the one relied 
upon by Appellant speaks in terms of "taxable real proper-
ties revalued, as provided in this chapter •••• " And, sub-
section 3 also relied upon by Appellant reads in part as 
follows: "All properties added to the tax rolls after 
January 1, 1978, in counties reappraised by the Tax 
15 
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Commission on or after January 1, 1978 •..• " (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
As can be seen from both provisions, the statute 
relates to the situation wherein the State Tax Commissi~~ 
Utah is conducting its reappraisal program. The statute ~ 
the subsections referred to above in no way relate to the 
annual duty of the various assessors in the various counties 
to assess property at its value as of January 1, 12:00 Nooo 
to its owner. If the Legislature had intended the 
reappraisal statute to so apply, it would have amended the 
various statutes set forth in Argument I of Respondents 
brief. However, rather than amend out the annual appraisal 
obligation it, in fact, reaffirmed that obligation in 1981 
when it amended 59-5-4 and left in the annual valuation 
requirement. See 59-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, 1981. As this Court has stated on previous 
occasions: 
" ••• one of the fundamental rules of statutory 
construction is that the statute should be looked 
at as a whole and in the light of the general pur-
pose it was intended to serve; and, should be ~ 
interpreted and applied as to accomplish that 
objective. In order to give the statute the imple· 
mentation which will fulfill its purpose, reason 
and intention sometimes prevail over technically 
applied literalness." Andrus v. Allred, 404 P. 2d 
972 (Utah, 1965) at P. 974. 
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Applying this principle of statutory construction 
to the statute relied upon by Appellant as limiting the 
assessor's authority, will clearly demonstrate to this Court 
that the limitations relied upon by the appellant apply to 
the situation when the State Tax Commission is reappraising 
an entire county and relates to the equalization process 
among the several counties of the State of Utah and, in no 
way relates to the processes within each respective county, 
It allows county-wide adjustment so that one county is not 
paying another county's share of the tax. 
Appellant, in their brief, equates the phrase 
"assessment level" with the word "valuation". Respondent 
would respectfully submit that the words do not have the 
same meaning. The Legislature has defined "value" in 
Section 59-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, sub-
section (5) which reads as follows: "Value" and "full cash 
value" mean the amount at which the property would be taken 
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor. That 
is what is meant by value as it relates to property taxa-
tion. While it is admitted that there is no statutory defi-
nition of "assessment level," respondent would assert that 
the phrase "assessment level" relates to reappraisal and 
results from the sales ratio studies conducted on an annual 
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basis by the State Tax Commission of Utah to ascertain t~ 
correlation between assessed value and actual market value 
within the various counties and to then determine the 
assessment level of each county as they relate to market 
value and as they relate to each other. Again, the concept 
of assessment level addresses the question of equalizatioo 
among the various counties, as implemented by the State Tu 
Commission, and in no way relates to individual properties 
within each county and the appraisal thereof by the Co~~ 
Assessor. The phrase, "level of assessment" then relates 
more to a class or grouping of properties rather than indi· 
vidual properties as is involved in the instant case. See 
Security Properties v. Arizona Department of Property 
Valuation, 537 P. 2d 924 (Ariz. 1975). 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the 
Appellant's reliance upon Section 59-5-109 as limiting the 
Assessor's ability to correct a previously underassessed 
property is not justified. The statute in question rela~s 
only to the reappraisal program conducted by the State Tax 
Commission of Utah and not to the individual valuation duty 
imposed upon the Assessor. That this misplaced relian~ 
results, in part, from a failure to recognize that the words 
"value" and "assessed value" have a different meaning than 
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the word "assessment level." And, even assuming arguendo 
that the Plaintiff-Appellant's interpretation were correct, 
a current valuation rolled back to 1978 may very well result 
in a different valuation than the 1978 value. There are 
other factors that can affect the market place relating to 
the value of a particular property other than inflation. 
Such as the addition of a new shopping mall or restrictions 
on the ability to build any more high-rise hotels or, the 
availability of competitive financing. All of these factors 
could have an affect upon the value of a property in 1980 
which, when rolled back to the 1978 value to remove the 
affects of inflation, could result in a substantially dif-
ferent value than the value was, in fact, in 1980. 
Therefore, under no circumstance could an argument be made 
that the 1980 value, even rolled back, would necessarily be 
the same as the 1978 value. Since the only evidence before 
the Trial Court for the year 1980 is the county's valuation, 
this Court should sustain that Court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Salt Lake County, respectfully submits 
that the Trial Court correctly applied the law applicable to 
this case and upheld the statutory duty of the County 
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Assessor to appraise properties to their owners, at their 
value, as of January 1, 12:00 Noon. And, further concluded 
that Section 59-S·-109 did not act as a limitation or impede· 
ment to this annual statutory duty but, applied to the 
reappraisal of the State of Utah by the State Tax Commission 
when it was conducting its reappraisal program on a county 
by county basis. Additionally, the only evidence in the 
record relative to 1980 value are the values set by Salt 
Lake County. This Court should not substitute its judgm~ 
for that of the taxing authorities in the absence of com-
petent evidence. It is therefore, respectfully submitted 
that the decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed in 
all respects. 
DATED this 2nd day of November, 1981. 
THEODORE L. CANNON 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of November, 
1981, two copies of the foregoing brief of Defendant-
Respondents, was served upon Louis H. Callister, Jr., 
Greene, Callister and Nebeker, attorney's for Appellant, 
.e..-....,..:;.v, Utah 84133. 
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